Spelman to Talk on Moral Luck

Everyone be sure to check out our colloquium next week (after Thanksgiving)!  Our very own alumnus, Jonathan Spelman, will be delivering a talk on moral luck.  Click on the link for more details!



Philosophy Colloquium to be Held at Ashland University


 

Metaphysics and Science

The relationship between Philosophy and Science has been less than ideal since the 18th century.  Their love affair survived distance, infidelity, and numerous other challenges, and if we are to believe the tabloids, they're heading for a rocky divorce, justified by "irreconcilable differences."  In his short blog entry reproduced below, Michael Egnor focuses on one significant point that, were it understood and taken seriously, might help us heal the relationship that actually emerged between these two disciplines.

 

Metaphysics Is Prior to Science

Michael Egnor

November 4, 2015 11:52 AM

Over the past couple of days I have been commenting on the modern debate about philosophy of the mind (see here and here). What follows are some thoughts on scientific versus philosophical discussions of the mind and other matters.

I was at a conference recently and was asked by friends who are quite sympathetic to the immaterial understanding of the mind if I could discuss some of the scientific evidence for it and not rely as heavily as I otherwise do on philosophical reasoning. It's an understandable request, and one that I hear often from allies and adversaries alike. 

Indeed there is much scientific evidence that the mind cannot be explained adequately in material terms, especially if one understands matter according to modern mechanical philosophy. I have an aversion to the use of scientific arguments to bolster claims that are inherently logical and metaphysical. Such recourse to scientific, rather than logical and metaphysical, arguments are the mainstay of materialist arguments about the mind, about biology, and about many aspects of physics. 

The difficulty with using raw scientific evidence, untethered from a valid metaphysical framework, is that it gives free reign to ideological bias. In that sense our metaphysical framework -- whether explicit or implicit -- is analogous to train tracks, where the trains are our scientific investigations, and the destination is the truth. Our scientific investigations are restricted to the tracks that the trains run on, and if we are to understand the truth of our science we must understand the tracks that constrain our work. If our metaphysical framework is materialistic, the destination of our inquiries will always be materialistic -- we can do no other.

Metaphysics is prior to science, and science goes horribly wrong if we have an error in metaphysics. An obvious example of profoundly misguided science that arose from metaphysical error is Francis Bacon's abandonment of teleology in the 17th century in favor of a mechanical understanding of nature. Evolution of living things is understood quite readily in a teleological framework -- the nonsensical invocation of tautology (survival of survivors) in the Darwinian fallacy is the direct consequence of the abandonment of teleology in natural science.

Another metaphysical error for which we have paid dearly is the abandonment of the concept of potency and act which is at the heart of Aristotelian metaphysics. Our misunderstanding of the "strangeness of quantum mechanics" such as the existence of myriad indeterminate quantum states that collapse to a single actual state upon observation is the direct consequence of the abandonment of Aristotelian potency and act with the rise of mechanical philosophy in the 17th century. Quantum indeterminacy confounded Bohr and Einstein and Schrodinger, who were trapped in mechanistic Newtonian metaphysics.

Aristotle wouldn't have blinked an eye at quantum indeterminacy -- the collapse of the quantum waveform is a simple manifestation of reduction of potency to act. Heisenberg, who understood Aristotle, understood this.

The use of scientific arguments for things for which they are not suited is a hallmark of scientism, and it is among the most pernicious errors of modern thought. It is important that we who oppose materialism and scientism don't employ scientistic arguments to refute scientism.

So my arguments about the mind are strongly metaphysical, with only occasional reference to clinical experience and to neuroscience. It is not true that neuroscience supports materialistic understandings of the mind; neuroscience in fact only makes sense if one sets aside modern mechanical metaphysics and looks instead to the classical hylomorphic metaphysics of Aristotle and the Scholastics. Bennett and Hacker have made this point in their profoundly important work to rid neuroscience of its philosophical junk.

Wholly materialistic models of the mind are wrong for logical and metaphysical reasons. Only when we understand those metaphysical errors can we properly interpret the scientific evidence.

Modern science is a metaphysical wasteland. Our sad state of affairs is that we moderns have much more scientific evidence than we have metaphysical insight with which to make sense of that evidence.

Image: Francis Bacon, by Frans Pourbus the younger [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons.

Spring 2016 Classes!

A scientist and an English professor walk into a bar.

The philosopher following them was careful to duck…

Check out these great Spring 2016 courses!

Phil 314: 19^th Century History of Philosophy

Dr. William Vaughan [M 6:30--9:15 pm]

The 19^th century remains one of the most volatile episodes in the history of philosophy, with revolutionary movements of thinking emerging in rapid succession. The first half of the century is marked by philosophical system-building, embodied by the efforts of German Idealism. We will look at Kant and Hegel as representatives of this endeavor. The second half is marked by system-destroying, that any philosophical ‘system’ of thought necessarily suffocates and suppresses human being. We will look at Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche as representatives of this task. After their explosive efforts, some have concluded that any efforts to construct a comprehensive philosophical system are fruitless. We will explore whether or not this is the case. Note: This course does NOT satisfy a core Humanities requirement, but non-majors can still get a lot out of this class.

 

Phil 317: Philosophy of Religion

Dr. Louis Mancha [TTh 12:15--1:30 pm]

Traditionally, it is claimed that the God of Western monotheism has certain distinct properties. God is said to be all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and all-good (omnibenevolent), for example. The significant worry is this: Are those properties consistent? In other words, is God really a possible being? If God is not a possible being, then is it even rational to believe in God? Many philosophers and theologians have developed problems and paradoxes that appear to result from a deeper analysis of these properties. The purpose of this class is to address and respond to these issues. We will study what it means to say that God has certain perfections or properties, and what is implied by them. We will also analyze some of the paradoxes and apparent inconsistencies that philosophers have observed in connection with these properties, and attend to some possible solutions to those paradoxes. Satisfies a Humanities core requirement.

Phil 330: Readings in Philosophy (C.S. Lewis)

Dr. Mark Hamilton [MWF 10--10:50 am]

Is Christianity reasonable?  What are the best arguments to confirm Christianity’s truth claims?  Do you know anything about the author of The Chronicles of Narnia?  This is a course on the most vital and most important Christian writer of the Twentieth Century, C.S. Lewis.  Lewis, an Oxford scholar, wrote marvelous works of fiction on unseen worlds and challenging books defending issues like the validity of miracles and the problem of suffering, along with popular essays probing life’s great mysteries.  Lewis has boundless insight to the historical and philosophical issues emerging in the Twentieth Century. Enjoy a course that will be explicitly Christian while addressing questions every non-believer asks concerning God. Satisfies a Humanities core requirement.

 

  COMPLETE YOUR CORE with these other Spring offerings!

Math/Logic:     Phil 220: Practical Thinking, Dr. Mancha

Humanities:     Phil 210: Phil. of Human Nature, Dr. Tiel

Phil 215: Ethics, Dr. Hamilton, and Dr. Mancha

Phil 280A: Sports Ethics, Dr. Hamilton

Phil 280B: Environmental Ethics, Dr. Vaughan

Bring your ‘A’ game to all your classes, whatever your major!

Learn to think philosophically.

10 Amazing Illusions

When thinking about the ancient problem of scepticism, what kinds of issues would have weighed heavily on the mind of the sceptic?  As Cicero conjectures, there's the problem of the bent oar, or the pigeon's neck, or judging the size of the moon using its visual dimensions.  No doubt the senses deliver to us conflicting information, they claim, so there's no reason to believe that we can have certitude about any impression or phantasia they deliver.

So let's enjoy these moments...

A Unique Scholarship/Study Abroad Program

The Davies-Jackson Scholarship provides a unique opportunity for graduating seniors with exceptional academic records who will graduate with a 3.7 or higher overall grade point average. To be eligible for the Davies-Jackson Scholarship applicants must be graduating seniors enrolled in one of the private liberal arts colleges and universities on the list of eligible institutions (Ashland is on the list!). The applicant should be among the first generation in their family to graduate from college, that is, the applicant’s parents should not have graduated from a four year college or university, or the applicant should not have benefitted from their parent’s academic achievements.

The Davies-Jackson Scholar will be admitted to Cambridge as an Affiliated Student.  An Affiliated Student is a graduate holding an approved degree from another university who is admitted to work for the Cambridge BA degree.  As this is essentially a second BA, Affiliated Students take the more advanced parts of a Cambridge degree course and qualify for the degree in two years instead of the usual three.  As a result of its academic rigor, the international travel opportunities that are available, and the overall preparation that the course of study provides towards a career, the “Cantab” degree is usually considered to be the equivalent of a Master’s degree in the United States.

For all the details and forms for this unique program, go to the main website HERE.

Details for this program are also on Facebook.

Undergraduate Publishing Opportunities

Many of our philosophy students do great research and write wonderful papers for our classes.  However, many students are not aware of the vast opportunities they have to show off their work and gain the recognition they deserve.

For anyone who has written a philosophy paper and is looking to try and get some recognition for it, be aware that there are undergraduate journals to which you can submit your work! Here are a few:

1. Phi Sigma Tau has an undergraduate journal, and you do not have to be a member to submit work!  It's called Dialogue:

http://phi-sigma-tau.org/dialogue.html

2. Another regional journal called Episteme is run out of Denison University:
http://journals.denison.edu/episteme/

3. Lastly, there's Stance, out of Ball State:
http://stancephilosophy.com/

For a list of even more journals and publishing opportunities for undergraduates, you can peruse the following site (courtesy of Luther College):

List of undergraduate philosophy journals

 

Do you love your Children? Teach them Philosophy...

All too often, students and parents alike question the value and purpose of a philosophical education.  They think that philosophy is either too theoretical or impractical, and believe falsely that it does not provide people with realistic skills for the changing job market.

However, a report from the Association of American Colleges and Universities on Liberal Arts Majors and Employment explains that employers give hiring preferences to college graduates that are innovative, can think critically, have strong written and verbal communication skills, can solve complex problems, and have good ethical judgment.  Studying philosophy can offer you these skills, and more.

 For the full report, click [HERE].

Further, these critical thinking skills should be developed much earlier in life.  The recently released year long study by the Education Endowment Foundation found that children practicing philosophy saw an improvement in their reading, writing and math skills: (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33464258).



Whether you're a teacher or a parent, you can begin teaching your children thinking strategies with Peter Worley's book "40 Lesson to Get Children Thinking"!  It's rich new resource with step-by-step lesson plans any teacher can implement straight away. Due for a October release, you can now pre-order a copy from Bloomsbury Publishing for 30% less than the RRP! Also available for pre-order through Amazon: http://goo.gl/rJ5inS




For more information on teaching philosophy to children, you can find a wide variety of resources, studies, articles, and advice from the Philosophy Foundation, both on Facebook and the Web.

Fall Philosophy Lecture!

The Department of Philosophy, AU Philosophy Club, and phi sigma tau proudly sponsor the following presentation:

Understanding Knowing How

Dr. Evan Riley

Department of Philosophy

College of Wooster

Friday, September 25, 2015 at 3 pm

                   in the Ronk Lecture Hall (138), COE

In recent years, the philosopher Jason Stanley has been defending a doctrine of intellectualism about knowledge how. The basic thought is that knowing how to f is fundamentally knowing a proposition; it is as propositional as any other kind of knowledge that. This doctrine is of course contrary to Gilbert Ryle’s view (with which many still have sympathy) that there is a basic distinction of kind: knowing how to f (on the one hand) and knowing that p (on the other). Here, I consider an argument against Stanley’s intellectualism. The argument hinges on appeal to the nature of skilled performance, and comes in two stages. Stage one is an elementary objection, which I expect Stanley’s defender to answer by appeal to the concept of a practical mode of presentation (or practical way of thinking). In stage two, I submit this appeal to critical scrutiny and find it wanting. The lesson I draw is that knowing how to f should not be construed as the Stanley-style intellectualist would have it.

Evan Riley is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The College of Wooster, where he teaches such subjects as ethical theory, logic, political philosophy, biomedical ethics, and the philosophy of mind. He is a generalist by temperament and was educated at the Universities of Louisville and of Pittsburgh. Evan has published on the self-defeating character of libertarianism and on the poverty of Amartya Sen’s criticisms of Rawls.

If you have a mind, you should attend!  Please join us for an enlightening discussion!

Platonic Forms and Sandwiches

Do you know what a sandwich is?  Really?  If so, then Socrates would like to have a word with you.


In the full article, Dr. M. Richey discusses her friend "Mike" and his constant fights about what objective qualities can be said to constitute a "sandwich". 


Click the link HERE and read the full article.  Meanwhile, enjoy the following dialogue:

Euthyphro and Socrates: The Sandwich

— Well, Socrates, I am happy to tell you what a sandwich is, as I have great knowledge of these things as you know.
— Thank you, Euthyphro, I will be glad to listen to you, for you are a learned man and I am just a poor beggar. So tell me, please, how can we know that which is a sandwich, apart from those things that are not sandwiches?
— Socrates, it could not be more simple. A sandwich is anything edible held in a container that is also edible.
— I see; that is very clear indeed. So this taco is a sandwich.
— No Socrates, that is a taco. A sandwich is something quite different, as you may quickly see by noting that they are called by different names.
— And yet, Euthyphro, here we have some soy ground beef—surely this is edible—and as you see, it is held in this container, which is a fried tortilla, and which I eat along with the material inside. Surely this is a sandwich!
— Well, Socrates, that is not quite right. I will try to be more clear: a sandwich is that which is edible, held in a container made of bread, surely.
— So then this hot dog, of course, is a sandwich. Thank you, Euthyphro!
— Well Socrates… a hot dog is something very like a sandwich, and yet it does not seem to me to be exactly a sandwich either, somehow. I see where you have misunderstood—let me clarify. A sandwich consists of some edible material, in between TWO pieces of bread, which must be separate from one another.
— I see; that is very clear indeed. So this pizza placed face down atop this other pizza, this is a sandwich.
— No, Socrates, I see that you do not understand at all. That is nothing like a sandwich.
— Now Euthyphro, how can this be? For truly here I see edible items—those are cheese, tomato sauce, and vegan pepperoni—and they are indeed to be found in between two pieces of bread—that is the pizza crust. How can this not be a sandwich, then?
— Well, Socrates, you have twisted my words around somehow. I did not mean ANY edible items in between ANY type of bread; I meant something rather more specific.
— Now Euthyphro, you are teasing a poor old man. You told me you would explain what a sandwich was, so that I might learn from your wisdom, yet now you seem to have told me nothing at all.
— Socrates, I will try to explain so that you might understand. A sandwich must be easily held in the hands, whereas two pizzas atop one another, as I’m sure you can see, are quite impossible to hold easily in the hands, as the whole is much too large and floppy.
— Ah, thank you Euthyphro, now I feel we are getting somewhere. Truly, now I think I understand. If a sandwich is something edible in between two pieces of bread, with the whole composed in such a way as to be easily held within the two hands, then obviously three pieces of bread, held together in the hands, is a sandwich.
— I do not see what you mean, Socrates. Surely a stack of pieces of bread is simply a loaf of bread, as any man knows.
— Now Euthyphro, you seem to be teasing me again, for look, here is a piece of edible bread, placed in between two other pieces of bread, the whole of which, you must agree, I hold quite easily in my hands, withered and shaking though they may be.
— Well Socrates, it is true, now that I think on it, that these three pieces of bread do in fact ascribe to my earlier definition. And yet, anyone could tell you that this is not a sandwich.
— Then Euthyphro I think you must start over, if you are ever to help me understand. Come now, don’t keep an old man waiting. Surely one as learned as you should easily be able to explain what a sandwich is to a poor old fool such as myself. Please begin again, and this time try to be more clear.
— Socrates I really must go, I will be late for my appointment.

A Theory of Jerkdom

Are you a jerk?  Would you even know it if you were?

Picture the world through the eyes of the jerk. The line of people in the post office is a mass of unimportant fools; it’s a felt injustice that you must wait while they bumble with their requests. The flight attendant is not a potentially interesting person with her own cares and struggles but instead the most available face of a corporation that stupidly insists you shut your phone. Custodians and secretaries are lazy complainers who rightly get the scut work. The person who disagrees with you at the staff meeting is an idiot to be shot down. Entering a subway is an exercise in nudging past the dumb schmoes. 

We need a theory of jerks.

Surprisingly enough, philosophers have thought about this.  Eric Schwitzgebel, professor of philosophy at University of California, Riverside, has a theory, and is willing to tell us about it.

Read the full article HERE.